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基于商业信用和收益共享的再制造闭环供应链协调模型

     

摘要

Closed-loop supply chain coordination is studied under the condition of trade credit. First of all, the pricing strategy in decentralized decision model is analyzed by using Stackelberg game theory, and then the pricing strategy under centralized decision model analyzed, a coordination mechanism of closed-loop supply chain based on trade credit and revenue sharing put forward, and finally, the impact of param-eter on the result of decision-making discussed by example analysis, thus quantitatively depicting the value of trade credit in the closed-loop supply chain coordination. Research shows that trade credit and revenue sharing contract can effectively coordinate the closed-loop supply chain, and coordination mechanism has implications in the practice of closed-loop supply chain.%研究了在商业信用条件下闭环供应链的协调问题.利用Stackelberg主从博弈方法分析了分散决策模式下制造商和零售商的定价策略,接着分析了集中决策模式下的定价策略,提出了一个基于商业信用和收益共享的闭环供应链协调机制,通过算例分析讨论了各参数对决策结果的影响,定量刻画了商业信用在闭环供应链协调中的价值.研究表明商业信用和收益共享契约能有效地协调闭环供应链,对闭环供应链管理实践具有较大的指导作用.

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