首页> 中文期刊> 《未来与发展》 >利益团体对公共政策制定的影响分析--基于博弈行为视角

利益团体对公共政策制定的影响分析--基于博弈行为视角

         

摘要

Policy formulation game analysis is a kind of game analysis to the policy participants' conduct during the formulation process, it contributes to policy formulation to inaugurate prediction and optimization. This article presents the hypothesis from interest groups point of view, aspects of the three value orientations of political, social and private, by using of game theory, Nash equilibrium, Prisoner's dilemma as game analysis tool for building model, and taking the participants' in the dynamic behavior process by learn and adjustment method as the basic elements of the game behavior. In addition, thus to import of bounded rationality perspective, combined with dynamic equilibrium and Pareto optimality, to specifically analyze the impact of interest groups’ constructive positive energy and destructive negative energy during the public policy formulation process.%政策制定博弈分析是指在政策制定过程中对参与者行为进行的一种博弈分析,有助于对政策制定展开预测与优化。文章从利益团体观点,依政治、社会及私人三个价值取向提出假设,运用博弈论中纳什均衡与囚徒困境为博弈分析工具建立模型,并将参与者在动态行为过程中的学习和调整方式,视为博弈行为的基本要素。此外,导入有限理性观点,结合动态均衡与帕累托最优,具体分析利益团体在公共政策制定过程中的建设性正能量与破坏性负能量对政策制定的影响。

著录项

相似文献

  • 中文文献
  • 外文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号