外部董事任期对董事会监督与咨询效率的影响研究--基于中小板上市公司的经验数据

摘要

We take outside directors’tenure as an explanatory variable,take CEO excess compensation and non-efficient in⁃vestment level as explanatory variables,where CEO excess compensation stands for board supervision efficiency and non-effi⁃cient investment level stands for board advisory efficiency,and propose relevant assumptions and make empirical analyses. The results show that:outside directors’tenure has a negative impact on board supervisory efficiency as well as firm’s perfor⁃mance,has a positive impact on board advisory efficiency. So the extension of outside directors’tenure is helpful for the im⁃provement of board advisory efficiency,but accompanied by the worsening of board supervision efficiency as well as firm’s per⁃formance. In sum,outside directors’two functions,which are supervision and advisory,are incompatible and cannot be re⁃placed with each other. While outside directors’supervision is the principle function,advisory is the auxiliary function. Only when the supervision function is effective,can board’s governance efficiency and firm’s performance be improved.%文章以外部董事任期为解释变量，以CEO超额薪酬所代表的董事会监督效率和以企业非效率投资水平所代表的董事会咨询效率为被解释变量，提出相关假设并进行实证检验。结果表明：外部董事任期与董事会监督效率负相关，与董事会咨询效率正相关，与企业经营绩效负相关。说明外部董事任期延长有助于董事会咨询效率的改善，但是以董事会监督效率和企业经营绩效的恶化为代价。外部董事监督与咨询彼此不相容且无法替代，其中外部董事监督为主要功能，咨询为辅助功能，只有监督功能得以有效发挥，才能提高董事会治理效率并改善企业绩效。