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A Study on the Influence of Local Top Leaders’ Corruption——An Empirical Analysis Based on the Municipal Party Committee Secretaries Sacked after the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

机译:地方最高领导腐败的影响研究-基于中共十八大后被解职的市委书记的实证分析

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摘要

Based on the cross-sectional data about the municipal Party committee secretaries sacked since the 18th CPC National Congress, this paper adopts a regression model to examine and assess the impact of local top Party leaders’ corruption. The study discovers that local heads’ integrity directly affects local political ecology they are in; that regions in the charge of corruptive heads suffer a higher degree of corruption; and that the tenure of corruptive local heads relates much to the degree of local corruption(i.e. the longer their tenure is, the more baneful influence they exert on the clean governance of local leaders and cadres). Consequently, it is imperative to establish and consolidate a power structure and a corresponding operating mechanism which enable effective mutual constraint and balance among decisionmaking power, executive power and supervision power. Only by doing so can China alleviate the negative impact of local heads’ corruption, effectively restrict and supervise local heads’ exercise of power, and maintain a well balance between ''''power delegation'''' and ''''power supervision''''.
机译:基于党的十八大以来被解职的市委书记的横断面数据,本文采用回归模型对地方最高领导层腐败的影响进行了评估。研究发现,当地首长的廉正直接影响他们所处的当地政治生态。负责腐败的负责人的地区遭受的腐败程度更高;并且腐败的地方负责人的任期与地方腐败的程度有很大关系(即,任期越长,他们对地方领导人和干部的廉政施加的影响就越大)。因此,必须建立和巩固权力结构和相应的运行机制,使决策权,执行权和监督权之间有效地相互制约和平衡。只有这样,中国才能减轻地方领导人腐败的负面影响,有效地限制和监督地方领导人的​​权力行使,并在“权力下放”和“权力监督”之间保持良好的平衡。 ”。

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