一种新的BT协议激励机制

摘要

BT系统的健壮性与稳定性受到参与节点合作程度的影响,然而大多数参与者的行为是自私的,常以最大化下载量和最小化上传量的方式进行下载,这种“搭便车”行为对BT系统的负载均衡及整体性能会产生严重的影响.本文从BT协议激励机制角度出发,提出一种新的激励算法,并将它集成到BT协议的CPN模型中,通过CPN TOOLS仿真模拟和验证分析说明该算法可以有效抑制搭便车行为,提升BT系统性能.%Robustness and stability of BT system is influenced by the degree of cooperation between nodes. Most of the nodes' behavior is selfish which maximize downloads and minimize uploads, this free-riding behavior has serious impact on system load balancing and overall performance. This paper proposes a new incentive algorithm according to original BT incentive mechanism, integrates it to BT' s CPN model and then makes a verification and performance analysis using CPN TOOLS, the results show this new algorithm can avoid free-riding behavior and improve system performance.