首页> 中文期刊> 《商业研究》 >国企高管政治动机、会计稳健性与投资效率——基于反腐风暴背景的实证分析

国企高管政治动机、会计稳健性与投资效率——基于反腐风暴背景的实证分析

         

摘要

The administrative color of SOEs in China has a distinct political motivation, which affects the investment de-cision-making and investment efficiency of enterprises.Based on the data of A-share listed companies of China from 2007 to 2016, this paper carries out empirical analysis of the relationship between the political incentive of SOEs, ac-counting conservatism and investment efficiency.Research shows that before ( after) the anti-corruption storm, SOEs tend to be more aggressive (defensive), leading to more severe over-investment (under-investment); accounting con-servatism alleviates the influence of executives'omission motivation on underinvestment, but the moderating effect on the over-investment caused by SOEs'aggressive trend is not significant.The research of this paper enriches the relevant liter-atures on the influence factors of the political incentives of the SOEs, and provides theoretical reference for resource allo-cation optimization and long-term development of state-owned enterprises after the anti-corruption storm.%我国国企高管的行政色彩使其具有鲜明的政治动机,从而影响企业的投资决策和投资效率.本文以我国国企A股上市公司2007-2016年数据为研究对象,对国企高管政治动机、会计稳健性与投资效率的关系进行实证分析.研究结果表明:在反腐风暴前,国企高管"急于求成"动机引致了投资过度,反腐风暴后国企高管"不作为"的动机导致了投资不足;会计稳健性缓解了国企高管"不作为"动机对投资不足的影响,但对国企高管"急于求成"动机与投资过度间的调节作用并不显著.上述结论丰富了国企高管政治动机影响因素的相关研究,为反腐风暴后国有企业的资源配置优化及长远发展提供理论参考.

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