土地财政、预算软约束与地方政府债务规模

摘要

A large body of research has investigated the causes and impact factors of local government debts; however, most of the conclusions about the impact of budgetary soft constraint were drawn by means of theoretical deductions. Based on the 28 provincial-level panel data from 2008 to 2011 and 2013 to 2015, this paper mutually uses the static panel regression and dynamic panel regression, controlling the variables such as the change of regional price index. The results show that there exist a significant positive relation among land finance, soft budget constraint and local government debt. This paper verifies the mediating effect of budgetary soft constraints in land finance and local government debt scale. In conclusion, to solve debt hazard of local government and relevant land management issues, the mortgage conversion of land resources should be strictly controlled to handle soft budget constraint; and a competitive land transaction mechanism should be properly established to facilitate the reform on land finance.%研究目的:从土地财政在政府举债中的重要地位出发,研究土地财政与预算软约束对政府债务规模的影响机制;实证分析预算软约束在土地财政和地方政府债务规模之间的中介效应;对控制地方政府债务规模、促进政府对土地资源的科学管理提出政策建议.研究方法:对2008—2011年和2013—2015年的28个省级面板数据进行回归分析;中介效应模型检验.研究结果:土地财政与预算软约束均与地方政府债务规模显著正相关;预算软约束在土地财政与地方政府债务规模间存在显著的中介效应.研究结论:解决地方政府的债务风险问题和土地管理问题,必须严控土地资源的抵押转化,限制预算软约束;同时适当引入竞争性的土地交易机制,促进土地财政、土地金融的改革.