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The Effects of Gross vs.Net Asset Value-Based Managers’Compensation on REIT Capital Structure and Performance:Evidence From the Italian REIT Market

机译:基于总资产净值与基于资产净值的管理人员薪酬对房地产投资信托资本结构和绩效的影响:来自意大利房地产投资信托市场的证据

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Investors should always argue about management fees because of their impact on net performance that can be substantial.This especially for investments,like real estate,which require intensive management.However,different from traditional mutual funds that are usually related to the gross value of the assets under management,but similar to other financial industry sectors(e.g.hedge funds and private equity funds),REIT managers’compensation structure typically provides a basically fixed payment based alternatively on gross asset value(GAV)or net asset value(NAV).In addition,managers usually also gain a performance fee.The paper analyses how the two alternative compensation schemes influence REITs’investment decisions and capital structure and,consequently,REITs’share value and performance.The final issue addressed is whether—and under which conditions—one compensation scheme is superior to the other.Due to the(usual)market price discount on NAVs,both fee structures incentivise managers to leverage—even in a tax-free environment—in order to maximize the management fees.However,the leverage motivation is stronger for GAV-based than for NAV-based REITs,which are also expected to be more selective in investment decisions.Overall,considering initial fee percentage,GAV-based REITs are expected to execute higher management fees than NAV-based REITs due to the relevant leverage effect.Moreover,debt recourse produces different effects on share value if measured upon market price or net asset value.The empirical analysis focuses on public Italian REITs(2002-2012).The results seem to support the theoretical expectations.GAV-based REITs experience higher debt trends and levels than NAV-based REITs.At the same time,GAV-based REITs register lower real estate asset returns gross and net of management fees for both current and growth yields.Differences in the returns lead to permanent higher performances over total return indexes of NAV-based REITs compared to GAV-based REITs.
机译:投资者应始终争论管理费,因为它们会对净绩效产生巨大影响。尤其是对于需要密集管理的房地产等投资而言。然而,与传统共同基金不同的是,管理费通常与基金的总价值有关。管理的资产与其他金融行业部门(例如对冲基金和私募股权基金)相似,房地产投资信托基金经理的薪酬结构通常根据资产总值(GAV)或资产净值(NAV)提供基本固定的付款。此外,管理人员通常还会获得绩效费。本文分析了这两种替代性补偿方案如何影响房地产投资信托的投资决策和资本结构,进而影响房地产投资信托的股票价值和绩效。最终要解决的问题是,是否以及在何种情况下,一种补偿方案优于另一种补偿方案。由于(通常)资产净值的市场价格折扣,这两种收费结构都可以激励管理者。为了最大程度地提高管理费用,即使在无税环境中也可以使用杠杆。但是,基于GAV的REIT的杠杆动机要强于基于NAV的REIT,后者也有望在投资决策中更具选择性。考虑到初始费用百分比,基于GAV的REIT由于相关的杠杆效应,预计将比基于NAV的REIT执行更高的管理费用。此外,如果以市场价格或资产净值衡量,债务追索对股票价值产生不同的影响。实证分析着重于意大利的公共房地产投资信托(2002-2012)。结果似乎支持理论上的预期。基于GAV的REIT的债务趋势和债务水平高于基于NAV的REIT。房地产资产收益总额(扣除当前和增长收益率的管理费用),收益差异导致基于NAV的REIT的总收益指数比基于GAV的REIT的永久收益更高。

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