The missing profiles and co-presencing: Finding a horizon of mutuality and intersubjectivity for a democratic political society in Husserl's phenomenology.

摘要

In this dissertation I discuss Husserl's missing profiles and co-presencing as two sides of the same coin. The missing profiles refer to the fact that objects are always richer and deeper than their presented sides. Co-presencing refers us to the fact that both the presence of the ego and the alter ego are important moments in the constitution of reality. The discussion of the missing profiles in the different stages of Husserl's phenomenology leads to the constitution of a healthy intersubjective space, as a political space. Politics is understood here as a space where humans share views, convictions, and constitutes objectivity through such discussions.;In the third and fourth chapters, I show that through the 3&d12; piochieta and the phenomenological reduction, we reach another level of the constitution of the invariant structure and its independence from act-qualities. I discuss in the third chapter inner time consciousness as the condition of such constitution. The main thing I demonstrated here is how now-phases are moments in the constitution of the identity and unity of the object. The thing-in-itself appears through time consciousness as the unity of its moments and not as the sum of fragmented independent parts. The unity of inner time is the unity of transcendental subjectivity, which is another name for objectivity. The enduring object is the unity of its parts, and such parts are the profiles available to different agents in the public sphere. The unity of the object itself appears to be the unity of the world as universal horizon and the condition for truthfulness. We cannot speak meaningfully unless we have a horizon-structure within which our words can make sense. This recognition of the world as universal horizon brings us to the recognition of our humanity and the necessity for us to conform to the ideals of humanity. Thus, as much as the ego constitutes meaning, it is also constituted in meaning as the common ground upon which the individual builds his or character as a human being. In genetic phenomenology, we experience objectivity as constituted through sedimentation of meaning - moments of time fall into one another and give the thing in-itself as condition of individual acts.;The givenness of the things and that of the ego through time help us see the possibilities open to consciousness. Truth and objectivity are a matter of the unfolding of the thing-in-itself that condition discussions. I draw the conclusions of such givenness and apply them to the specific political situation of Chad. The main guiding statement of my fifth chapter is thus that once we get to meaning and truth as the unfolding of the thing-in-itself it is difficult to react otherwise than to conform to such manifestation. The public and political spheres must be modeled on the truthfulness of the thing-in-itself. Political decision making and discussions become thus a matter of capturing and expressing such givenness. Political societies as societies constituted in meaning carry a "public sense of reason" with all the obligations that it carries. They are reasoned societies that must insert themselves into a higher-order-we as humanity itself. The validities of their specific actions must conform to the validities of humanity as such. The ultimate check for such validities (normality) is a correspondence to what humanity means in-itself. This leads me to my critique of the Chadian politics as a failure to capture and express the validities of the world as universal horizon. Abnormality is thus allowed to constitute itself into normality and to become the guiding principle of decisions and discussions. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).;The work is divided into five chapters. In the first and second chapters I discuss Husserl's conception of the constitution of ideal objects. I discuss the invariant structure and objectivity as the universal referent for individual acts. Through this discussion, what comes to view is that the thing-in-itself is not a private property, but that it belongs to the world as universal. I discussed this by following Husserl's critic of subjective reason as a technological reason that is reduced to mere performativity. Such reason reduces objects into being purely intramental or the purely transcendent. I follow at this point Husserl's critique of the skeptical relativism of the psychologist and the naturalization of reason by the scientist. Perspectival givenness, the givenness of objects through profiles, brings to awareness their non-intramental character. I will insist in these two chapters on the fact that for Husserl, the invariant structure and the objective character of fogic reveal that objects are not exhausted in and by their modes of presentation.The permanence of identity and ideality of objects through different act-qualities is a sign of their inexhaustible richness and depth.