The strategic environmental presidency: Explaining the use of presidential environmental actions.

摘要

Presidents, wielding an array of informal and formal powers, have historically advanced their policy agenda through Congress to pass legislation. Yet presidents have also strategically avoided the traditional means of policy-making by creating policy unilaterally using direct policy-making tools, such as executive orders, proclamations, memoranda, and signing statements. Using a 40-year, time-series statistical analysis, this dissertation examines how modern presidents have exercised the power of unilateral action to create environmental policy. The dissertation explores questions about how and why presidents -- in their approach to environmental policy -- use direct action to make policy. Using two regression models to help answer these questions, the dissertation demonstrates that the use of environmental direct action increases as presidential political capital decreases. Thus, the dissertation strengthens the strategic view of the presidency, showing presidents are more likely to go it alone and make environmental policy unilaterally when they experience lower levels of political capital.