首页> 外文学位 >Frege's Realism Revisited: A Critique of Recent Trends in Frege Scholarship.
【24h】

Frege's Realism Revisited: A Critique of Recent Trends in Frege Scholarship.

机译:重新审视弗雷格的现实主义:对弗雷格奖学金最近趋势的评论。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

According to the historically dominant interpretation of Frege's philosophy---The Traditional Interpretation (TI), as I call it---Frege held a variety of metaphysical theses typically associated with the labels "realism" and "Platonism." According to a more recent trend in Frege scholarship, the traditional reading of Frege's metaphysics has got it wrong. Proponents of this brand of interpretation---what I call The Revisionist Interpretation (RI)---hold that Frege was fundamentally opposed to views of the realist/Platonist sort. Through critically evaluating and assessing the motivation for RI, one goal of my dissertation is to undermine this growing trend among Frege scholars. Another is to mount a defense of the traditional reading of Frege's metaphysical outlook. In so doing I aim to not only vindicate TI against RI, but also to dislodge a number of unwarranted assumptions which have a strong hold in contemporary Frege scholarship.;In the first chapter, I show that the debate between TI and RI converges on a single aspect of Frege's thinking: his conception of mind-independence or objectivity (Objectiviat). What is important about Frege's conception of objectivity---what I dub "gottlobjectivity"---is its metaphysical implications. If gottlobjectivity commits Frege to mind-independently existing items such as numbers and propositions, then he is a realist and Platonist. Proponents of RI are united in denying this, holding that gottlobjectivity is incompatible with metaphysical theses of either sort. The central claim that I aim to establish in my dissertation, then, is this: gottlobjectivity commits Frege to a variety of metaphysical theses falling under the rubrics "realism"/"Platonism." .;The second chapter outlines two widely endorsed arguments for RI. According to the first---"The Truth-Theoretic Challenge to TI"---Frege's conception of truth precludes him from being a realist. According to the second---"The Epistemological Challenge to TI"---certain of Frege's epistemological doctrines are only acceptable on an RI-friendly interpretive scheme. The third chapter then turns to a critical assessment of The Truth-Theoretic Challenge to TI. To this end, I first show that proponents of this challenge have failed to properly distinguish Frege's semantic theory from his metaphysical views. The reason for this, I argue, is that these interpreters have falsely assumed that realism is a semantic thesis. Once we drop this assumption, it is clear that the challenge altogether fails to undermine TI.;The fourth chapter examines a much neglected aspect of Frege's thinking, namely, his philosophy of aesthetics. Here, I first defend the claim that Frege endorsed a rather extreme version of aesthetic non-realism: subjectivism. Second, I demonstrate that Frege's claims about the subject matter of aesthetics, when conjoined with his claims about truth, entail that he was a Platonic realist about truth. Finally, in light of these results, I defend the view that gottlobjectivity commits Frege to a variety of metaphysical theses falling under the rubrics "realism"/"Platonism.";In the final chapter, I return the second widely endorsed argument for RI, The Epistemological Challenge to TI. There, I argue that the revisionist claims concerning Frege's epistemological doctrines are unfounded. The mistake here is that Frege simply did not have the epistemological concerns that contemporary philosophers associate with realist/Platonist doctrines. And once we take this into consideration, it is clear that Frege's epistemological outlook is well accounted for on TI.
机译:根据弗雷格哲学的历史上占主导地位的解释-我称之为“传统诠释(TI)-”,弗雷格持有各种形而上学的论文,这些论文通常与“现实主义”和“柏拉图主义”标签相关。根据弗雷格奖学金最近的发展趋势,对弗雷格形而上学的传统解读是错误的。支持这种解释的品牌-我称之为修订主义者的解释(RI)-认为弗雷格从根本上反对现实主义者/柏拉图主义者的观点。通过批判性地评估和评估RI的动机,我的研究目标之一是破坏Frege学者中这种增长的趋势。另一个是捍卫弗雷格对形而上学观点的传统解读。我这样做的目的不仅是证明TI反对RI,而且要消除在当代弗雷格奖学金中有很强基础的许多无根据的假设。在第一章中,我表明TI和RI之间的争论集中在弗雷格思想的一个方面:他的思想独立性或客观性(Objectiviat)的概念。弗雷格的客观性概念(我称之为“客观性”)重要的是它的形而上学含义。如果说获得客观性使弗雷格致力于与大脑无关的现有项目(例如数字和命题),那么他就是现实主义者和柏拉图主义者。 RI的支持者一致否认这一点,认为客观性与任何一种形而上学的论点都不相容。因此,我打算在论文中确立的中心论据是:客观性使弗雷格犯下了各种形而上学的论点,这些论点属于“现实主义” /“柏拉图主义”。第二章概述了有关RI的两个广泛认可的论点。根据第一个主题“对TI的真理理论挑战”,弗雷格的真理概念使他无法成为现实主义者。根据第二个“对TI的认识论挑战”,弗雷格的某些认识论学说只有在RI友好的解释方案中才可以接受。然后,第三章转向对TI真理理论挑战的批判性评估。为此,我首先表明,这一挑战的支持者未能正确地区分弗雷格的语义理论和他的形而上学观点。我认为,这样做的原因是这些解释者错误地认为现实主义是一个语义论题。一旦我们放弃了这个假设,就很明显,挑战完全不会破坏TI。第四章探讨了弗雷格思想的一个被忽视的方面,即他的美学哲学。在这里,我首先捍卫弗雷格赞同美学非现实主义的一个极端版本:主观主义的主张。其次,我证明弗雷格关于美学主题的主张与他关于真理的主张相结合,意味着他是柏拉图式的关于现实的现实主义者。最后,根据这些结果,我捍卫了这样一种观点,即“客观性”使弗雷格犯下了各种形而上学的论点,这些论点属于“现实主义” /“柏拉图主义”的范畴。 TI的认识论挑战。在这里,我认为修正主义者关于弗雷格的认识论学说的主张是没有根据的。这里的错误是弗雷格根本没有当代哲学家与现实主义者/柏拉图主义相联系的认识论问题。一旦考虑到这一点,很明显,弗雷格的认识论观点在TI上得到了很好的解释。

著录项

  • 作者

    Waters, Chapman.;

  • 作者单位

    Purdue University.;

  • 授予单位 Purdue University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.;Metaphysics.;Epistemology.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2017
  • 页码 191 p.
  • 总页数 191
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:54:18

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号