Free will in light of theology: An examination of theistic determinism, open theism and agent causation theory views of the will and their relationship with core Christian beliefs.

摘要

This dissertation explores the relationship of various theological issues to views of free will. It examines the views of theistic determinism, open theism, and the proposed Anselmian-Molinist Agent Causation (A-MAC) theory as they relate to certain theological topics, and it argues that the view of the nature of the will of Anselm of Canterbury combined with the view of foreknowledge of Louis de Molina provides the best means of explaining the goodness of God, the freedom of God, the foreknowledge of God, and the freedom of humanity in the various theological stages of existence.;Chapter one presents the various views of free will presented in modern literature and then briefly explores the three theological views that will be covered. This survey is followed by an explanation of each of the theological arguments to be covered. First, the goodness of God is considered and it is argued that God must be essentially good. After this discussion, the problem of evil is considered as an attack on the goodness of God and a version of the logical problem of evil specific to determinism is developed. Next, the freedom of God is considered and it is argued that God should be seen as the most free being. This idea then leads to the consideration of the problem of how to affirm divine freedom if God always does what is best. The third theological topic considered is the foreknowledge of God and it is argued that scripture does indeed seem to affirm that God possesses foreknowledge of the choices of free creatures. At this point, open theists' argument that foreknowledge denies freedom is briefly examined. Finally, there is an examination of humans in the various theological stages of existence. It is argued that one can view humanity as having five theological stages of existence---pre-fallen, fallen, sanctified, glorified, and damned. Various problems of the will are raised based on this understanding of the human stages of existence including two arguments related to humanity in the glorified state.;Chapter two explores theistic determinism as is seen in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, Jonathan Edwards, John Frame, and John Feinberg. This chapter focuses particularly on the attempts by these authors to overcome the logical problem of evil and it is argued that none successfully demonstrate that God is not blameworthy for evil in their system. On top of this, the theistic deterministic view of humanity is explored and it is argued that the portrait of humanity provided by these thinkers is contrary to common intuitions about the nature of humanity.;Chapter three is an examination of open theism and focuses on the writings of Richard Rice, Gregory Boyd, and William Hasker. This view is primarily critiqued in terms of its denial of foreknowledge. It is argued that open theists cannot demonstrate a logical inconsistency between God possessing foreknowledge of a choice and that choice being free. Furthermore, this chapter explores the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) definition of the freedom of the will used by all of the open theists featured in this chapter and argues that this definition of the will makes both God and glorified beings not free. Thus, this chapter argues that open theism is not an acceptable view both because of its denial of foreknowledge and its definition of the freedom of the will.;Chapter four presents the proposed A-MAC view. It begins with an exploration into the thought of Anselm and Molina followed by a brief survey of some modern discussions of the nature of free will that relate to this view. Then the A-MAC view is proposed. A-MAC has three key elements. First, it uses the idea of agent causation to describe both the nature of the will and the freedom of the will. Second, it uses a hierarchical account of the will to explain the range and rationality of human choices, and finally, it uses a Molinist account of divine knowledge to explain divine exhaustive foreknowledge. Next, this proposed A-MAC view is considered in relation to the various theological issues presented throughout the dissertation. It is argued that A-MAC is consistent with modern attempts to overcome the logical problem of evil. Furthermore, it is argued that this view provides a definition of freedom that allows both God and glorified beings to be free. Additionally, the issues related to freedom and foreknowledge are presented, and it is argued that Molinism provides God with a functional foreknowledge that allows for humans to make free choices.;Finally chapter five serves as a summary of the arguments of the dissertation and it argues that A-MAC provides a superior view of the issues related to God, free will, and foreknowledge in that it avoids making God blameworthy for evil while at the same time affirming a view of freedom that allows God and glorified beings to be free. After this, some areas for further studies are considered like the implications of this view on the theological issues of soteriology and the inspiration of scripture.