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Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger: An interpretative appraisal.

机译:胡塞尔和海德格尔的意向性:一种解释性的评价。

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摘要

The dissertation endeavors to study the controversial relationship of the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger by investigating their respective treatments of intentionality. Husserl's reflective and Heidegger's hermeneutical accounts of intentionality are brought into bold phenomenal relief in order to secure the phenomenal basis underlying their conflicting views of both the character and status of this phenomenon. Specifically, the study discusses Husserl's reflective exhibition of intentionality in terms of its manifestation of the phenomenally original essence of lived-experiences, and Heidegger's immanent critique of the same in terms of its manifestation of phenomenally derivative understanding of Being.;The discussion shows that Husserl finds the reflective securing of intentionality to manifest the most original phenomenal manifestation of die Sachen selbst, while Heidegger finds the hermeneutical securing of the same to manifest the (non-intentional) temporalization of Dasein's being-in-the-world. The issues underlying the discrepancies of these two phenomenological findings are brought into relief with a discussion of the philosophical "prerogatives" of each thinker's understanding of phenomenology. These issues emerge in terms of the Heideggerian 'prerogative' of the hermeneutical advance regard toward Being, and the Husserlian 'prerogative' of the reflective seeing of the phenomenological regard. The study finds that the unavoidable opposition of the phenomenal content of these issues has its basis in the character and status each accords to the essence of the phenomenon of "reflection." The study concludes with a consideration of the phenomenal warrant of what comes forward as die Sachen selbst of the Husserlian 'prerogative' of the ontologically neutral reflective uncovering of the phenomenon of transcendental subjectivity and the Heideggerian 'prerogative' of the hermeneutical disclosure of the ontico-ontological disclosedness of the unreflective phenomenon of Being.
机译:本文试图通过研究胡塞尔和海德格尔的现象学的有争议的关系,研究它们各自的意向性处理方法。胡塞尔对意图的反思和海德格尔的解释学解释被大胆地进行了现象学缓解,以确保他们对这种现象的特征和地位的相互矛盾的观点背后的现象学基础。具体而言,该研究从对生活经验的显着原始本质的表现出发,讨论了胡塞尔对意图的反思性展示,并从对现象存在的惊人衍生理解的角度出发,对海德格尔对内在意图的内在批判进行了讨论;讨论表明,胡塞尔他发现意向性的反射性安全性体现了萨琛·塞尔布斯特的最原始的现象表现,而海德格尔发现了意向性的反射性安全性体现了该在世界的(非故意的)时态化。通过讨论每个思想家对现象学理解的哲学“特权”,可以缓解这两个现象学发现之间的差异所隐含的问题。这些问题是从海德格尔式的对存在的诠释性提前关注的“特权”和赫塞尔式的对现象学的关注进行反思的“特权”出现的。研究发现,不可避免地反对这些问题的现象性内容,其依据是性格和地位,它们都与“反射”现象的本质相吻合。该研究的结论是考虑到萨申·塞尔布斯特(Sachen selbst)提出的对本体论中性反射现象的本体论中性反射性揭示和海德格尔式的本体论解释性解释的海德格尔式的“特权”的现象证明。存在的非反射现象的本体论揭示。

著录项

  • 作者

    Hopkins, Burt C.;

  • 作者单位

    DePaul University.;

  • 授予单位 DePaul University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1988
  • 页码 211 p.
  • 总页数 211
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:50:49

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