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Hume's theory of moral judgment: A study of 'A Treatise of Human Nature'.

机译:休ume的道德判断理论:《人性论》的研究。

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摘要

While Hume insists that "sympathy," or fellow feeling, is the primary source of moral evaluation, he recognizes that sympathetically acquired feelings vary in emotional intensity according to a number of factors he regards as morally irrelevant. The question arises as to how the changeableness of sympathy can be reconciled with the "stable" moral judgment. It emerges that the sympathetic judgment becomes corrected by adopting, what Hume calls, a "general point of view.".;Specifically, the theory of belief and "general rules" in Bk.I of the Treatise accounts for both the prejudice which besets the moralist and the method which corrects such prejudice. In Bk.III, Hume only makes implicit references to the place of general rules in moral judgment. It is urged that without a full appreciation of the theory of belief and general rules in Bk.I, Hume's ideas about moral judgment are far too brief to be understood and are therefore subject to a number of misconceptions.;Part One examines Hume's ideas about human reason and Part Two aims to clarify Hume's notion of sympathy. Both parts seek to explain how the "trivial properties" of the imagination are responsible for the "unreasonable" judgment of fact and the "partial" judgment of merit. These properties, or over-generalizing propensities, generate the general rules of the imagination. It is by means of the general rules of the understanding, the rules which regulate initial judgments by an act of reflection, that factual judgments become reasonable and moral judgments impartial.;What is of interest is the ongoing dialectic of the two sorts of general rules, the "combat" of reason and imagination, which, it is maintained, Hume never resolves. Although it is concluded that Hume's theory of moral judgment ends with the same skepticism as does his theory of belief and general rules at the close of Bk.I, the positive role that both reason and imagination play in the development of science and morality is also stressed.
机译:休ume坚持认为“同情”或同伴感觉是道德评价的主要来源,但他认识到,同情获得的感觉在情感强度上会根据他认为与道德无关的许多因素而有所不同。提出了一个问题,即同情的变化如何与“稳定的”道德判断相协调。结果表明,通过采用休ume所说的“一般观点”来纠正同情判断。;具体而言,《论语》 Bk.I中的信念理论和“一般规则”解释了困扰的偏见。道德主义者和纠正这种偏见的方法。在Bk.III中,休ume仅隐含地提及一般规则在道德判断中的位置。敦促在没有充分理解Bk.I的信念理论和一般规则的情况下,休ume关于道德判断的思想过于简短以至于无法理解,因此受到许多误解的影响;第一部分考察了休ume关于思想的看法。人为的原因和第二部分旨在阐明休ume的同情概念。这两部分都试图解释想象力的“琐碎属性”如何造成事实的“不合理”判断和价值的“部分”判断。这些属性或过度概括的倾向产生了想象力的一般规则。借助于理解的一般规则,通过反思的行为调节初步判断的规则,事实判断变得合理,道德判断公正无私。有趣的是,两种一般规则的持续辩证法休is始终坚持不懈地解决理性和想象力的“战斗”。尽管可以得出结论,休ume的道德判断理论与他的信仰和一般规则理论在Bk结束时都受到了同样的怀疑。I,理性和想象力在科学和道德发展中所起的积极作用也是强调。

著录项

  • 作者

    Brand, Walter Saul.;

  • 作者单位

    City University of New York.;

  • 授予单位 City University of New York.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1991
  • 页码 373 p.
  • 总页数 373
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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