Secondary intelligibles: An analytical and comparative study on first and second intentions in Islamic and Western philosophy.

摘要

This thesis deals with one of the essential problems in epistemology, that is, the foundation and variety of universal concepts. The classical controversy on universals is baseless if we do not consider different kinds of universal concepts. In this thesis, universal concepts are examined as classified into three groups: first intentions, logical second intentions and philosophical second intentions.;We elaborate these three kinds of concepts from two perspectives. First, we have a journey in the history of Islamic philosophy from Farabi to contemporary philosophers in order to see what they mentioned in this regard. We found that the origin of the distinction between first and second intentions in Ibn Sina; however, he does not mention the philosophical second intentions, rather this kind of intentions is added sometime after Suhrawardi and Tusi We also examined William of Ockham's theory for the purposes of a comparative approach. Second, we discussed this threefold division based on our own understanding and analysis in the light of both Islamic and Western philosophy.