A law and economics approach to criminal gangs.

摘要

Adopting an economic approach to criminal street gangs offers insights into the nature and operations of criminal street gangs and suggests ways in which criminal laws can be designed to address the threats posed by criminal gang activities more effectively. In this series of papers, a law and economic approach is used to explore the ways in which gang organization and decision making varies in response to changes in economic factors. Once the street gang is viewed in functional terms as a rational mechanism for satisfying individual objectives, an economic organization approach can be applied to generate rational and testable explanations for observed patterns of gang behavior.; The first study emphasizes the need to incorporate the economic organization of gangs into rule design. It highlights the danger of imposing group based penalties without paying sufficient attention to the organizational structure of the group. The results suggest that attempts to control group based activities may be counter-productive if law enforcement tools are not tailored to the nature of gang activities. The second paper builds upon the existing economic framework within which studies of group behavior are conducted. It provides a survey of alternative modeling techniques and identifies areas in which group behavior is likely to diverge from individual behavior. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part provides a survey of economic approaches towards groups which can be used to model gang behavior. The second part focuses on an approach to organizations which captures a key feature of gang activity. The final paper provides theoretical and empirical support for adopting an economic organization approach towards criminal street gangs. The paper is motivated by observed differences in the organizational structure of gangs in different locations and variations across ethnic groups. Beginning with the hypothesis that gangs are profit maximizing organizations which adapt to economic conditions, the paper develops a model which suggests conditions under which a particular organizational form will be more or less likely and then compares the results with empirical observations of organizational choice.