Individual transferable quotas and concentration of the fleet: The case of the Scotia-Fundy Mobile Gear Fleet (Nova Scotia).

摘要

Economic theory predicts that an open-access common property fishery will lead to an overexploitation of the resource, overcapacity in the fleet, and the dissipation of any resource rents. One of the solutions proposed to solve the problem is the establishment of property rights, or quasi-property rights, through the introduction of individual quotas.; In 1991, a system of individual quotas was introduced into the inshore mobile gear fleet in southwest Nova Scotia. In this thesis, I test one prediction of the theory; that is, that excess capacity will be reduced over time with the introduction of individual quotas. Using data from 1991 to 1994, I examine the change in the concentration of quota holdings by licence over time, and find some evidence of increasing concentration over the four years. This suggests the system of individual quotas has had some effect in reducing the number of active licences, and hence boats, in the fishery. The evidence is only partially complete, however, as the quotas only became permanently transferable in 1993. There is also anecdotal evidence that, even with permanent transferability possible, fishermen were reluctant to transfer quota permanently, still preferring to have temporary transfers only.