Success and failure in the AEF style of warfare: Artillery, 2 Division, and the search for solutions in 1918.

摘要

This thesis examines artillery employment in one American division (2 Division) throughout its World War I combat experience. This detailed approach suggests that the AEF may not have been the brilliant force described by General Pershing, nor as ineffective as revisionists have claimed. Chapter One examines the differences between official AEF combat doctrine and that of the other Allied armies, and the effects of that doctrinal conflict on the training of the AEF divisions. Chapter Two focuses on the division's first two battles, near Chateau-Thierry and Soissons, and identifies the costly lessons learned concerning official AEF doctrine, and the value of overwhelming artillery support. Chapter Three analyzes the division's final three battles at St. Mihiel, Blanc Mont, and the Meuse-Argonne, and demonstrates that the division could successfully accomplish artillery-centered, set-piece attacks. The thesis suggests that a particular style of warfare developed in the AEF divisions.