Blindsight: An essay in the philosophy of psychology and mind.

摘要

Although philosophers acknowledge the significance of blindsight (roughly, vision without visual consciousness) for theories of mind---indeed, some try to trade on it---they have not given the phenomenon the extended treatment it deserves. In helping to fill this gap, I argue that despite attempts to use it in undermining qualia (the felt qualities of experience), blindsight supports realism about qualia, and an identity theoretic account of them.;In Chapter 1 I argue against attempts by Dennett and the Churchlands to use blindsight in undermining qualia. I complement this by criticizing their more general arguments against qualia.;In Chapter 2 I argue that blindsight in fact supports realism about qualia. To do so I bring together four separate points from the literature and add to them a fifth, adapted from an observation by Jerry Fodor.;In Chapter 3 I argue that blindsight is best explained by saying that the qualia patients conspicuously lack are causally involved in normal vision. I also argue that this is not ruled out by principled objections of the usual sort, and is best cashed out by identity-theory.;In the Conclusion I discuss some of the other areas of philosophical concern on which blindsight has been thought to bear: color-theory, intentionality, theories of knowledge, and issues in perception.