A family fight: The Suez crisis in American foreign policy decision making.

摘要

The Suez Crisis of 1956 was one of the most interesting events of the Cold War and in Anglo-American relations. American leaders weighed a number of factors in their decision to oppose the Allied invasion of Egypt. The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration believed that the United States simply could not afford to support the invasion, as it threatened the American position and influence in the Middle East. Yet, despite the complexity of this decision, the crisis quickly resolved itself. Thus, the Suez Crisis was not so much a crisis as it was a "family fight" among the allies over the proper course of action to take against Egypt' s nationalization of the Suez Canal. No nation in the western alliance was willing to allow the Suez affair to rip apart the anti-communist coalition. This "family fight" theory is particularly evident in the Anglo-American reconciliation that followed the Suez event. The Anglo-American relationship was quickly restored due to personal rapport, successful conferences, and the American willingness to share nuclear technology. Therefore, much like a fight among family members, the western participants of the Suez Crisis agreed, resolved their differences, and returned to the policy of the Cold War--the containment of communism.