Scholars continue to debate vigorously the extent to which political parties impact electoral politics. Some scholars claim that candidates typically act like selfish, single-minded office seekers. These scholars emphasize the candidate-centered nature of current electoral politics. They conclude that parties have become increasingly marginalized within the electoral arena. Conversely, other scholars believe that candidates typically act like team-oriented office seekers. These scholars highlight the incentives party members have to pool their personal campaign resources for collective purposes. From this Downsian perspective, scholars view parties as adaptive creatures that remain both powerful and pervasive electoral actors.;In this study, I assess the nature and the extent of political parties' current electoral influence by examining how various campaign contributors distributed resources across candidates contesting the 1994 and 1996 U.S. House elections. To understand better parties' electoral influence, I first study the degree to which parties' allocation strategies complement or conflict with business PACs' allocation strategies. I then examine the extent to which various party actors coordinate their allocation strategies.;The evidence suggests that parties complement PACs' allocation strategies quite systematically. While both parties and PACs are likely to fund competitive candidates, PACs are likely to target strategically positioned incumbents whereas parties are likely to target candidates who do not already possess key political assets. The evidence further suggests that party actors exert considerable effort in attempting to coordinate their allocation strategies. Whereas party campaign committees and party leaders redistribute funds to less fortunate partisans, influential party members redistribute their funds to party committees and party leaders. Within party organizations, money is constantly being re-channeled to those actors who most desperately need it. Few electoral activities could so vividly demonstrate party actors' willingness to pool their resources and to promote collective office seeking objectives. Few electoral activities could so clearly illustrate that parties are indeed electoral teams whose players are not only willing but eager to pass the buck.
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