An empirical analysis of government programs in low- and middle-income countries: Community forestry in Nepal and child allowances in Slovenia.

摘要

In this dissertation, I analyze the implementation and operation of two different types of government programs in two countries. First, I study the implementation of a massive institutional reform in Nepal. Countries and donors around the world are promoting participatory development and community management programs that transfer responsibilities and rights to local communities. Large-scale implementation of these schemes requires significant funding, often from multiple sources. In the first chapter, I show how different sources of official development assistance lead to an uneven and imperfect implementation of an institutional reform with the case of community forestry in Nepal. As a consequence of the aid structure, some areas of the aid recipient country are vulnerable to missing any benefits of institutional improvements.; In the second chapter, I explore the impact of government initiated community forestry on deforestation, focusing on household use of forests as sources of fuel. Analysis of cross-sectional data from the Arun Valley of Nepal suggests that community forestry projects reduce household fuelwood collection and force households to adopt alternatives to collecting firewood. For wealthier households, this means purchasing firewood; poorer households increase their use of garbage and dung as a fuel. The results of this chapter are consistent with government initiated community forestry reducing the average household's fuelwood collection by more than 10%.; In the third chapter, I examine the implementation of child allowances in Slovenia. Transition economies are turning to their child allowance programs to provide economic security for families with children. However, budgetary pressures are forcing many countries to trim their social spending. Targeting child allowance programs to the poorest households may be a compromise solution, and the unique structure of Slovenia's child allowance program (Otroski Dodatek) allows me to examine participation in a means-tested program and to consider the program's behavioral effects. I find that the problem of eligible households not participating in the program is driven by the value of the benefit the household expects to receive. Once a household receives a child allowance, it treats the allowance like any other source of income.