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The macroeconomics, game theory and econometrics of regime changes.

机译:政权更迭的宏观经济学,博弈论和计量经济学。

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摘要

The formation of expectations and its consequences on agents' actions are critical considerations when analyzing the impact of shocks on economic outcomes. This dissertation thus focuses on incorporating these aspects to understand the effects of occasional large shocks on macroeconomic and financial variables, potentially interpretable as changes in underlying political and economic regimes.;The theoretical part of this dissertation involves the interplay between policy and expectations, when there can be either large shocks to underlying policy regimes or when there can be policy challenges presented by economic mechanisms that bring about large and persistent shifts. In the first case, I am concerned with understanding how policy actions can be best undertaken when private agents have imperfect information about underlying government objectives or type. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 explore this set of ideas in the context of fiscal and monetary policy, respectively. Through those concrete examples, I provide a theory for the evolution of reputation and its consequences in optimal policy design, which is absent in the existing literature.;In the second case, I am interested in how policy can serve as an information extraction tool for both the government and the agents to learn about latent fundamentals. In Chapter 3, I work on a class of economies where strong strategic complementarity in production and imperfectly observed productivity generate phases of self-fulfilling "optimism" and "pessimism". There, the signal of underlying productivity largely depends on the aggregate activities by the agents, which gives rise to an innovative "information role" of policy. That is, the tax policy can manipulate agents' coordination so as to accelerate or delay information revelation.;When a shock occurs in the economy, the response of agents varies substantially depending on whether the shock has a long-lasting or short-lived effect. Thus, the empirical part of this dissertation deals with how to estimate the occurrence likelihood of such permanent components in the underlying shock process. Chapter 4 estimates a random level shift model for volatility series of popular stock market return indices. The main finding is that permanent shocks occur only infrequently but have disproportionately pronounced influence.
机译:在分析冲击对经济结果的影响时,期望的形成及其对代理人行为的影响是至关重要的考虑因素。因此,本论文着重于将这些方面结合起来,以了解偶发性的大冲击对宏观经济和金融变量的影响,并有可能解释为潜在的政治和经济制度的变化。本论文的理论部分涉及政策与预期之间的相互作用。可能是对基本政策制度的巨大冲击,也可能是经济机制带来的政策挑战带来了巨大而持续的变化。在第一种情况下,我关心的是当私人代理人对政府基本目标或类型的信息不完善时,如何最好地采取政策行动。第1章和第2章分别在财政和货币政策的背景下探讨了这套思想。通过这些具体的例子,我提供了声誉演变及其在最优政策设计中的后果的理论,而这在现有文献中是不存在的。第二种情况,我对政策如何用作信息提取工具感兴趣。政府和代理商都可以了解潜在的基本知识。在第三章中,我研究了一类经济体,在这些经济体中,强大的生产战略互补性和不完全观察到的生产率产生了自我实现的“乐观”和“悲观”阶段。那里,潜在生产力的信号在很大程度上取决于代理商的总体活动,这引起了政策的创新“信息作用”。就是说,税收政策可以操纵代理商的协调,以加速或延迟信息的披露。当经济发生冲击时,代理商的反应会因冲击是长效还是短效而有很大不同。因此,本文的实证部分涉及如何估计潜在的永久性分量在潜在冲击过程中的发生可能性。第4章为流行的股票市场收益指数的波动率系列估计了随机的水平移动模型。主要发现是永久性的冲击很少发生,但是影响却不成比例。

著录项

  • 作者

    Lu, Yang K.;

  • 作者单位

    Boston University.;

  • 授予单位 Boston University.;
  • 学科 Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 286 p.
  • 总页数 286
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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