Suarez and Meinong on beings of reason and non-existent objects.

摘要

The central purpose of this dissertation is to compare Suarez's treatment of beings of reason with Meinong's treatment of non-existent objects. The dissertation is divided into three parts. In the first part I analyze Suarez's view of beings of reason. I do this first by giving a general overview of Suarez's philosophy (Chapter 2); second, by explaining Suarez's notion of real being (Chapters 3 and 4); and finally, by analyzing Suarez's notion of beings of reason (Chapter 5). In the second part I analyze Meinong's view of non-existent objects. I do this first by giving a general explanation of the relevant parts of Brentano's philosophy (Chapter 6); second, by explaining Descartes' and Twardowski's epistemology as background for Meinong's (Chapter 7.A.); third, by explaining Meinong's view of metaphysics (Chapter 7.B.); and finally, by analyzing Meinong's Theory of Objects (Chapter 7.C.). In the third part I compare Suarez's treatment of beings of reason with Meinong's treatment of non-existent objects. I argue that, as a consequence of their similar epistemological views, their metaphysical treatments of beings of reason and non-existent objects are similar. Finally, as an appendix, I discuss how Suarez and Meinong compare with Russell on the problem of denoting.