Liberal internationist: Roger Hilsman.

摘要

Among the most pressing issues in the historiography of American diplomatic history is United States' involvement and failure in Vietnam. For years, numerous works have provided an abundance of explanations for both. Yet, in spite of the abundance of research, the role of one of the principle architects of Vietnam policy during the Kennedy administration, has continually been overlooked. This study critically examines the role State Department advisor Roger Hilsman played in directing policy. Through a survey of his academic, military, and political experiences, it aims to make sense of his, and America's, involvement and failure in the quagmire that became Vietnam.; In examining Hilsman's life prior to the advent of the New Frontier, it becomes apparent that he served as a prototype of the activist-intellectual---the Best and Brightest as termed by David Halberstam. Imbued with a sense of optimism regarding America's mission in the world and confident in his ability to succeed, his eagerness and arrogance reflected the mind set which encouraged an American commitment in Vietnam. Likewise, his strategic thinking with regard to Southeast Asia indicated that American failure in Vietnam rested on a variety of factors. Among the most important were a failure to neutralize the insurgency in neighboring Laos, the faulty implementation of the strategic hamlet program, an unwillingness on the part of Americans to embrace counterinsurgency and pacification, and last, the encouragement of the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem.