Defining ethical Christian discourse within classical rhetorical and Kierkegaardian frameworks: An ironical study in existential deliberation.

摘要

Throughout its history, Christian discourse has had ethical controversies because of its ceaseless relationship with rhetorical persuasion. Defining existential rhetoric, which relies on the "canons" of memory and passion, for Christian discourse largely resolves these controversies and opens the way to defining ethical Christian discourse. To this end, I propose a definition of rhetoric that weaves together various other definitions with Kierkegaard's views on existentialism and that suggests how rhetoric introduces and disseminates philosophy, ethics, and belief within a Christian community.;Rhetorical argumentation alone, I argue, limits Christian discourse because rhetoric can be used to demonstrate that a particular objective truth exists, which should be agreed upon communally. The effect of stressing the existence of an objective truth is twofold: First, this notion creates hierarchies among people and ideas, which are antithetical to ethical Christian discourse. Secondly, those who cannot identify with this particular (i.e., objective) truth are alienated from the discourse community and forced into marginalized positions, if they are allowed a position at all. My view of rhetoric, as enriched by Kierkegaard's writings on existentialism, delineates the relationship between the ethical and Christian discourse. Moreover, Kierkegaard's theories and his understanding of Socratic irony demonstrate how language creates moral choice for the individual not only within ethical Christian discourse but also any other socio-political discourse(s).