Virtues, pluralism, and human nature: Prospects for an integration of virtue ethics and modern moral theory (Alasdair MacIntyre, Saint Thomas Aquinas).

摘要

In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre contends that modern efforts to justify a universal, supra-cultural morality have eroded ethical thinking. Against such universalist approaches, MacIntyre attempts to define and defend the classical tradition of the virtues. On this view, ethical life involves, most importantly, the pursuit of a communally defined conception of the good life for human beings.; I propose that various aspects of ethical theorizing can be understood as occurring at three phases of concern. These three phases involve, first, human nature, second, communally defined pursuits, and, third, abstract universal principles. MacIntyre develops his theory within the confines of the second phase (the phase concerning communally defined pursuits). This restricted Phase 2 focus makes it difficult, however, for MacIntyre's position to be adequately responsive to modern pluralistic conditions. His position is vulnerable to relativistic distortions in two serious ways. First, MacIntyre's position is unable to avail itself of the intercultural understandings that we may reasonably expect to result from a serious ongoing examination of Phase 1 human nature (and its implications for the good life). Second, because of his avoidance of Phase 3 universal moral principles, MacIntyre's position seems unable to help us, dependably, to identify and oppose immoral cultural pursuits.; I examine the importance and possible justification of each of the three phases of ethical theory. In order to pursue both excellence and the common good, optimally, we need to avail ourselves of insights into the Phase 1 nature of human beings. In order to protect human dignity, it appears important to identify and defend inviolable moral boundaries. Like MacIntyre, however, I find little reason to expect that Phase 3 abstract principles can be justified through any of the strategies proposed by modern theorists. It seems, thus, that Phase 3 universal principles will have to be founded upon a base of Phase 1 human nature and its Phase 2 engagements. MacIntyre has moved in just such a direction with the recent publication of Dependent Rational Animals . I assess this book and offer suggestions for the further development and support of MacIntyre's position.