The eye's mind: A philosophical discourse on the non-inferential and conceptual nature of visual perception and its implications for educational theory.

摘要

Visual perception, I argue, is both conceptual and non-inferential. This opposes philosopher Tim Crane (following Gareth Evans and Christopher Peacocke) and vision scientist Zenon Pylyshyn who contend perception is nonconceptual. It also opposes philosopher Gilbert Harman and vision scientist Irvin Rock who subscribe to perceptual inference theory. Regarding my first claim, because object recognition---perceptual categorization of particulars as instances of types---is all-pervasive within visual perception it must be regarded as conceptual. Regarding the second claim, neither retinal stimulations nor beliefs can be "premises" for inferences, as claimed in perceptual inference theory. The former are not conceptually structured and, although beliefs sometimes influence perception, the fact that many visual illusions are not revised by contrary beliefs shows that they are also not premises for inferences to perceptions.