首页> 外文学位 >Optimal design of online auctions.
【24h】

Optimal design of online auctions.

机译:在线拍卖的优化设计。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

Internet auctions are projected to account for 30% of all e-commerce by 2002. The Internet not only dramatically reduces the cost of running and participating in auctions, it also introduces new capabilities and hence new degrees of freedom in carrying out online auctions. This dissertation uses both economic modeling and data analysis techniques to build decision tools to optimally design online auctions. We quantify the market impact of increasing the number of units that are offered in a single auction, and show how to set the optimal auction duration and optimal lot-size. We find that increased dispersion in consumers' valuations exposes the auctioneer to higher risk with respect to the auction's closing price, which may go up or down. The net effect is determined by the relationship among the website traffic, the auction duration, and the lot-size. We then study the effects of splitting the available inventory into multi-period auctions, each offering a smaller lot. We demonstrate that it may significantly increase the auctioneer's profit and show how to compute the optimal number of periods and the optimal lot-size in each period. By learning the dispersion of consumers' valuations at the end of each period, the auctioneer can improve the design of future auctions and considerably increase his profit. We find that learning is vital when the website traffic is low, the holding costs are high, and the dispersion is low. Also, with learning the optimal lot-size policy may no longer be monotonic. Finally, we study the effects of concurrently offering the same good via both an online auction and an electronic retail store. We find that auction winners enjoy an average discount of 25% over purchasing an identical product in e-retail. We also measure the extent and magnitude of the cases in which the auction price ended up higher than the retail price. Modeling the consumer as making a choice between the two mechanisms, we provide an explanation for the discounts observed in our research. Our model shows that despite cannibalization of e-retail sales, retailers may be better off introducing auctions on their websites. These results provide a cohesive framework for electronic auction designers, beginning with analyzing the decision whether to introduce an auction at all, continue with devising tools to optimally design a single auction, and concluding with the design of a series of auctions.
机译:到2002年,Internet拍卖预计将占所有电子商务的30%。Internet不仅大大降低了运行和参与拍卖的成本,而且还引入了新的功能,因此在进行在线拍卖时具有新的自由度。本文运用经济建模和数据分析技术来构建决策工具,以优化设计在线拍卖。我们量化增加单次拍卖中提供的单位数量对市场的影响,并展示如何设置最佳拍卖持续时间和最佳手数。我们发现,消费者估价中分散度的增加使拍卖人面临着拍卖收盘价的更高风险,而收盘价可能会涨跌。净效果取决于网站访问量,拍卖持续时间和手数之间的关系。然后,我们研究将可用库存分成多个时期的拍卖的效果,每个拍卖都提供较小的数量。我们证明这可能会大大增加拍卖商的利润,并说明如何计算每个时期的最佳时期数和最佳手数。通过了解每个时期结束时消费者估值的离散度,拍卖师可以改善未来拍卖的设计并显着增加其利润。我们发现,当网站流量低,持有成本高且分散性低时,学习至关重要。同样,通过学习,最佳手数策略可能不再单调。最后,我们研究了通过在线拍卖和电子零售商店同时提供相同商品的影响。我们发现,与在电子零售中购买相同产品相比,拍卖获胜者平均享有25%的折扣。我们还评估了拍卖价格最终高于零售价格的情况的程度和严重性。将消费者建模为在两种机制之间做出选择的模型,我们对研究中观察到的折扣进行了解释。我们的模型表明,尽管电子零售销售被蚕食了,但零售商最好在其网站上进行拍卖。这些结果为电子拍卖设计师提供了一个有凝聚力的框架,首先是分析是否要进行拍卖的决定,然后继续设计工具以优化设计单个拍卖,最后进行一系列拍卖的设计。

著录项

  • 作者

    Vakrat, Yaniv.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Rochester.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Rochester.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Marketing.; Economics Commerce-Business.; Mass Communications.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2001
  • 页码 129 p.
  • 总页数 129
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;贸易经济;传播理论;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:46:46

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号