The Implementation of Governance to Counter Islamist Militancy in Pakistan's Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province

摘要

Militancy inspired by Islamists is escalating globally, and government action is necessary to protect vulnerable populations. Security professionals generally agree that governance may complement the use of force to defeat militants; however, current doctrine does not address the concurrent integration of governance in a comprehensive strategy. This interpretive case study explored Pakistan's application of governance during the 2009 Khyber operation in Swat Valley, code-named Operation Rah-e-Rast. The central research question focused on how governance activities were integrated with military operations to subdue militancy. Data were collected through interviews with 6 planners, Pakistani secondary source survey data, and government artifacts. Data were inductively coded using a progressive axial coding process and validated through methodological triangulation. Data were then analyzed using a case study analytical model, grounded in neo-Clausewitzian theoretical principles, to derive key themes. Key findings indicate that an interministry collaborative approach to regain the public trust was more effective in placating violence than was solely using military action. Sound governance, enabled by strategic communications and intelligence, fostered tribal relationships that promoted confidence and undermined the militant support base. The civil-military planning protocols were successful, but mainly ad-hoc and suboptimized. Formal training, standing civil-military planning forums, and planning process improvements stemming from the Pakistan experience could instill social change by assisting national leaders in developing a cogent countermilitancy strategy to defeat the global Islamist movement.