A consistency of purpose: Political warfare and the national security strategy of the Eisenhower administration.

摘要

The Eisenhower administration's use of political warfare in its national security strategy reveals a consistency of purpose; Eisenhower and Dulles came to office committed to the use of political warfare. It was, in their view, a key component of cold war. Over the course of the following years, the administration adjusted the tactics of political warfare in Eastern Europe and around the world to meet specific contingencies, in response to specific developments, and based on assessments of what worked best.;Political warfare was part of a long-term strategy to win the Cold War. The U.S. response to specific events in Hungary must be viewed in this context as well. In the critical days of 1956, Eisenhower was not concerned about the fate of a specific East European country. He was focused on how developments there would shape the broader cold war. The U.S. response to the Hungarian revolution was part of the longterm strategy, not an indication of failed policy. The revolution provided further indictment of the Soviet Union's oppressive ways, and confirmed the most recent thinking of the administration's favored means of approach as specified by the Millikan Committee. The lack of controversy or NSC discussion about political warfare in the second administration is an indication of how intimately woven into the fabric of the administration's approach political warfare had become. Eisenhower had specifically requested that only controversial issues should be addressed in the NSC. Political warfare was no longer controversial inside the administration; it was a critical function of their efforts.