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Orientation: Kant and the Aesthetic Content of Cognition.

机译:取向:康德与认知的审美内容。

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My dissertation is motivated by the conviction that contemporary debates about the role of conceptuality in cognition and perception suffer from the general neglect of Kant's Critique of Judgment. More specifically, I set out to show how Kant's aesthetics harbors a fully defensible account of empirical cognition capable of overcoming the deficits inherent in both the empiricist and conceptualist alternatives. The overarching argument of the dissertation is that the notion of orientation as used by Kant offers one concrete example in which our affective capacities are drawn on in perception and cognition.;I begin in Chapter 1, "Orientation in Kant", with a close analysis of the essay of 1786 and argue against standard interpretations that rather than fitting in neatly as a midway point between the epistemology and metaphysics of the first Critique and the aesthetics of the third, the largely overlooked question of how we orient ourselves in the world puts a curious strain on central tenets of Kant's own critical system, in particular, the conviction that affects are merely subjective and therefore "feeling is not a faculty whereby we represent things, but lies outside our whole faculty of knowledge" (A801/B829 n.a). In that case, the moment of worldly orientation, as it arises briefly in a minor essay, proves to be at odds with Kant's official and systematic division of labor between the subjectivity of aesthetics and the objectivity of epistemology. But the leading thread of the dissertation is that, on closer consideration, orientation is not a momentary departure from Kant's own better judgment but brings full circle a line of thought opened up by the "Copernican Turn" according to which the objects of experience and knowledge are not corrupted, but rather made possible in the first instance, by the disclosive and judgmental capacities of human subjectivity. In its basics, the notion of orientation requires that the "Copernican" insight into how our human subjectivity makes the objects of experience available to cognition is not be limited to our discursive or conceptual capacities but must include our affective sensibilities as well.;If the first chapter amounts to an "analysis" of the notion of orientation, the remaining chapters offer a "deduction" or demonstration why a functional ability to orient ourselves must already be built into our ground-level ability to experience and make sense of the empirical world. In Chapter 2, "The Double-Function of the Imagination", I use developments in the third Critique to fill-out the enthymematic doctrine of the "productive imagination" as presented in the first Critique for the purpose of identifying where an orientational capacity can be located in a Kantian account of mind. In order to make an orienting imagination not only tenable as a reading of Kant but plausible in itself, I work to demystify Kant's otherwise cryptic claim that the mental function of "apprehension" by which we passively sense empirical content is the "same power" as the "exhibition" of concepts by which we actively make sense of the world (5:279). With the double-function of the imagination as both passive and active firmly in hand, I then turn in Chapter 3, "Taste and the Intentionalist Accounts of Pleasure", to unknot the convoluted relationship between the imagination and the feeling of pleasure in aesthetic judgments of taste. I set out to argue, against several prominent interpretations, that judgments of taste are not judgments made about a feeling of pleasure but rather are judgments made by way of a feeling of pleasure (viz. pleasure is not the referent but the form of judgments of taste). Over and against causal and priority theories of the role of pleasure in judgments of taste, I defend an "internalist" or "intentionalist" account of aesthetic judgment according to which pleasure plays an internal and active role in bringing form to an aesthetic object and is thus part of the judgment itself.;Having located the feeling of aesthetic pleasure in the double-function of the imagination, I will have assembled out of Kant's account of taste all of the pieces needed to build out to the notion of orientation in which affective states are discriminatory of our ground-level, basic experiences of objects in the world. The move "From Taste to Orientation" is the goal of Chapter 4 but first requires showing that the intentional role played by pleasure in aesthetic judgment can be extended to other affects or feelings. Establishing that the feeling at play in aesthetic judgment cannot, in principle, be limited to pleasure amounts to a negative defense of orientation. I conclude the chapter, however, by trying to show that there are sufficient resources within the third Critique to prefigure a more satisfying positive defense of orientation. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).
机译:我的论文是基于这样的信念,即关于概念性在认知和感知中的作用的当代辩论受到了对康德批判批判的普遍忽视。更具体地说,我着手说明康德的美学是如何完全辩护的,能够克服经验主义者和概念主义者的内在缺陷的经验认知。论文的最高论点是,康德所使用的取向概念提供了一个具体的例子,其中我们的情感能力被运用在感知和认知上。我从第一章“康德的取向”开始,并进行仔细分析。 1786年论文的论点,并反对标准的解释,即不是很好地适合于第一个批判的认识论和形而上学与第三个批判的美学之间的中间点,而关于如何将自己定位于世界的问题被大大忽略了康德自己的批判体系的中心原则产生了奇怪的压力,特别是,影响的信念仅仅是主观的,因此“感觉不是我们代表事物的能力,而是我们整个知识的能力之外”(A801 / B829 na)。在这种情况下,世俗取向的时刻,如在一篇简短的论文中短暂出现的,被证明与康德在美学的主观性和认识论的客观性之间的正式和系统的分工不符。但是,论文的主要思路是,经过仔细的考虑,定向并不是暂时脱离康德自己更好的判断,而是使“哥白尼转向”开辟了一条思路,根据这一思路,经验和知识的对象并没有因为人类主观性的披露和判断能力而被破坏,而是首先成为可能。从根本上说,定向的概念要求“哥白尼”对我们的人类主观性如何使经验对象可用于认知的见解不仅限于我们的话语或概念能力,还必须包括我们的情感敏感性。第一章是对定向概念的“分析”,其余各章提供了“演绎”或示范,说明了为什么必须已经将定向自身的功能能力构建到我们体验和理解经验世界的基础能力中。在第二章“想象力的双重功能”中,我使用第三次批评中的发展来填补第一次批评中提出的“生产性想象力”的语气学说,目的是确定在哪里定向能力可以处于康德式的思想状态。为了使定向的想象力不仅可以理解为对康德的理解,而且本身具有说服力,我努力揭开康德本来就神秘的主张的神秘性,即我们通过被动地感知经验内容的“忧虑”的心理功能与积极理解世界的概念的“展示”(5:279)。我将想象力的双重功能牢牢掌握在被动和主动之间,然后转到第三章“品味和意向性描述”,以消除审美判断中想象力和愉悦感之间复杂的关系。的味道。我提出反对几种著名的解释,即对品味的判断不是对愉悦感的判断,而是对愉悦感的判断(即愉悦不是指称,而是对愉悦感的判断形式)。味道)。相对于愉悦性判断中愉悦作用的因果理论和优先理论,我捍卫了审美判断的“内在主义”或“意图主义”论据,据此,愉悦在将形式带入审美对象中起着内在和积极的作用,并且因此,将审美愉悦感置于想象力的双重功能中,我将根据康德的品味观点,组装出所有必要的要素,以建立感性的取向概念。状态是对我们在世界上物体的地面基础体验的歧视。 “从味道到取向”是第四章的目标,但首先需要表明,愉悦在审美判断中扮演的故意角色可以扩展到其他情感或感觉。原则上说,不能将审美判断中的参与感限制为愉悦,这就是对方向的消极辩护。但是,在结束本章时,我试图表明第三批批评中有足够的资源来预示更令人满意的积极方向辩护。 (摘要由UMI缩短。)。

著录项

  • 作者

    Tinguely, Joseph J.;

  • 作者单位

    New School University.;

  • 授予单位 New School University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.;Epistemology.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 235 p.
  • 总页数 235
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:45:33

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