Thrown Projection: An Interpretation and Defense of the Hermeneutic Conception of the Self in Heidegger's 'Being and Time'.

摘要

In the dissertation, I interpret and defend Martin Heidegger's conception of human identity. I argue that his approach is superior to contemporary alternatives advanced by Christine Korsgaard and Harry Frankfurt, respectively. Heidegger shares Korsgaard's systematic concern with the task of active self-constitution. He shares Frankfurt's systematic concern with the importance of caring and receptivity. The Heideggerian conception, however, explains these phenomena in terms of the pervasive social dimensions of human identity. Korsgaard and Frankfurt overlook the social dimensions. This causes problems in their views, problems that Heidegger does not face.;According to Heidegger, sociality, what he calls "being-with," is constitutive of individual identity. Hence, on this view, a philosophical theory of the self that operates with an impoverished conception of sociality is bound to face difficulties. The social dimensions of human identity can be theorized neither in terms of immediate instinctual determination, nor in terms of an individual's free reflective choice, and yet Korsgaard and Frankfurt are limited to these options. This limitation stems from a fundamental assumption that Heidegger criticizes and that Korsgaard and Frankfurt share, despite their many disagreements: that the core features of human agency are built-into each individual mind. I show that this assumption produces internal tensions and explanatory deficiencies in the theories of both Korsgaard and Frankfurt.;The Heideggerian view includes a powerful re-conception of the distinction between the receptive and the active dimensions of human agency ("thrownness" and "projection", respectively), as well as the distinction between heteronomous and autonomous modes of agency (Heidegger's "inauthenticity" and "authenticity"). Heidegger construes both distinctions in terms the essential sociality of human identity. His conception of the human being as a "thrown projection" explains the core phenomena of human agency while avoiding the problems that arise for Korsgaard and Frankfurt on account of their weak conception of sociality.