Varieties of Capitalist Development: The Political Determinants of Economic Governance Systems.

摘要

This thesis uses a typological framework to explain why the core functions of economic activity vary so significantly from state to state. I explain this variation by linking large structural factors to micro-level decisions. The typological framework I employ examines the interaction between levels of systemic vulnerability faced by governments on the one hand and the number of veto players on the other. I hypothesize that states without the institutionalized constraints embodied in multiple veto player governments will only develop the broadly-targeted policy environment necessary for coordinative economic governance institutions when sufficiently high levels of vulnerability serve as an alternative form of constraint. Additionally, I hypothesize that states with very many veto player governments will be unable to overcome the tendency towards the sorts of particularistic policies that lead to hierarchical economic governance institutions, regardless of the level of vulnerability. I use this framework to account for variation in economic governance institutions in Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.