Corporate governance and the symbolic management of stakeholders: The emergence of a shareholder value orientation in Germany.

摘要

This research examines the processes by which corporate governance models diffuse across institutional environments. So far, the dominant view of such diffusion processes uses a legal-economic framework and an efficient-choice perspective predicting convergence on a "standard model" of corporate governance. In contrast, I develop a socio-political model of diffusion that stresses the cultural embeddedness of diffusing ideas. Drawing on the literature on the diffusion of practices among organizations and on the growing literature on symbolic management, I argue that the diffusion of governance models is not a smooth transfer of efficient practices because governance models embody normative claims and therefore are subject to contest and conflict. As a result, governance models do not go through the diffusion process unchanged but are subject to adaptation and re-invention as local actors engage in contests over their meaning and applicability. I furthermore suggest that implementation is often incomplete and superficial as surface compliance with an institutional model is substituted for "deep" compliance. I test these arguments by examining the spread of a shareholder value orientation (SVO) in Germany, using a longitudinal dataset that incorporates social, financial, and demographic variables for the 100 largest German corporations over the last 10 years.