For the sake of oil, for the sake of prestige or for the sake of power: Did cooperation among the governments of the United States and Great Britain contribute to the 1953 coup of Iran?

摘要

During the Cold War, when a wave of nationalism was spreading around in Asia and the Middle East, the nationalist government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown by foreign and internal elements in the coup of 1953. This work uncovers the events of the overthrow with respect to the Cold War context. The fear of communism resulted in hysteria and the hyperbolic perspective of the Eisenhower Administration toward nationalist movements during the Cold War era. This work combines both old and new historical trends in order to reconstruct the events of the coup of 1953 and examines all the external and internal factors that contributed to the coup. The study uncovers all governmental and non-governmental actors who collaborated together to conduct the coup.;The thesis examines the U.S.'s traditional alliance with Great Britain, Britain's overplaying the U.S.'s Cold War hysteria, corporations and their use of the intelligence service in influencing foreign policy, and the role of adventuresome men who shaped the policy process in Iran in 1953.;By relying on documents in Farsi and English, interviews, and newspapers, oral histories from the Harvard Iranian Project, documents from the International Court of Justice, speeches of Dr. Mossadegh, memoirs of policymakers and intelligence service officers, and treaties signed between Iran and the United States after the coup, this study provides insight into understanding a missed opportunity for Iran that continues to color U.S.-Iranian relations today.