Determinants and implications of executive pay dispersion and compensation to investor relations officers.

摘要

The first chapter of this dissertation examines the relation between pay dispersion among top executives and firm performance, executive turnover, and earnings management. I find that deviations from normal dispersion are associated with deterioration in firm performance and higher executive turnover. I also document a positive relation between abnormal pay dispersion and earnings management. This study contributes to accounting literature by suggesting that abnormal pay dispersion provides incentives for earnings management.;The second chapter of this dissertation investigates a sample of larger publicly-traded US companies with a designated investor relations (IR) executive, who is among the top five paid employees. We provide initial evidence regarding the level and components of compensation for these IR executives relative to other executives. We examine the company's choice to elevate the IR function and its relation with future earnings persistence. Finally, we provide evidence that firms with an IR executive among the top five paid employees are more likely to meet or just beat analyst expectations.