A relative facts interpretation of Everettian quantum mechanics.

摘要

The properties of the fundamental objects of our world seem to be determinate. However, the explanation for why this is so is not straightforward because quantum mechanics, under the standard interpretation, predicts that properties in fact are typically not determinate until they are observed. On the standard interpretation, there are two logically incompatible ways of explaining how a system's properties change over time: when the value of some property of a system is measured, that property instantaneously and randomly takes one of its possible determinate values; when no measurement is made of a system, the property remains indeterminately valued. The logical incompatibility of these two rules is called the measurement problem, and it is a serious flaw of the standard interpretation.;Other interpretations of quantum mechanics offer radically different explanations of determinate measurement records. The interpretation proposed here, the relative facts interpretation, seeks to explain what seem to be determinate properties through the use of facts as relations. Because the evidence motivating my arguments comes from quantum mechanics, the first chapter explains the basic physics required to fully understand the issues at hand. I then turn to a discussion of a popular family of interpretations of Everett: the many worlds interpretations. I argue that none of these has managed to completely avoid deep philosophical problems.;I next turn to a discussion of the relative facts interpretation. I show how the concepts of non-separability and non-supervenience used in other holistic metaphysical theories inspired by quantum mechanics can also be used in a faithful and charitable interpretation of Everett. After formally defining absolute and relative facts, I use textual evidence from Everett's published and unpublished work to show that the relative facts interpretation is a natural and conservative extension of his relative state formulation of quantum mechanics.;Finally, I consider the metaphysics of the relative facts interpretation. Facts about objects should not be considered as facts, simpliciter, but rather as facts as relations. I also carefully consider the metaphysical implications of having an ontology built from a foundation of facts as relations.