War and politics: The neoconservative plan for Iraq.

摘要

This thesis utilizes a Foucauldian method to investigate the discourse of a neoconservative movement largely responsible for the decision to invade Iraq. After describing its important components, an outline of the discourse's two main features is provided: two-level thinking, and the tension of 'isolationism-expansionism'. These features are brought into focus through an examination of the two-step plan for Iraq. This examination leads us to believe that a Clausewitzian view of war is what makes the plan theoretically possible. A critical engagement with Clausewitz's work is thus followed, and a paradox within this work is presented. This paradox raises important questions for the neoconservative plan. It is concluded that the discourse's architects fail to adequately deal with the main question this paradox raises: how is it possible to quickly undertake a transition from war to politics? This failure seriously questions this movement's viability as an intellectual basis for foreign policy making.