The desire of Dasein: Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotelian , o&d12;r3 xiv (Martin Heidegger).

摘要

This study develops a Heideggerian thesis on the significance of Aristotelian , o&d12; r3xiv for the ontological genesis of Dasein as care (Sorge). In Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie (Summer 1924), Heidegger determines the two fundamental possibilities of movement or how Dasein relates to its own being in the world as a` i&d12;r 3siv or di&d12;wc iv ---"taking for oneself" or "pursuing" and 4ugh&d12; ---"fleeing". The observation that Dasein is determined by both possibilities of movement testifies to Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotelian , o&d12; r3xiv . The trajectory towards this claim begins during the early Freiburg seminars and lectures and Heidegger's discovery of his central topic, die Sache selbst or ki&d12;nh siv as an ontological movement or mode of presence that is productively brought about and essentially constituted by its relation to an absence ( st3&d12;r hsiv ). Dasein is this existential movement of striving towards its own absential finitude that literally produces the presence of being-in-the-world and thereby makes possible its discursive relation ( l3&d12;g3 in ) to entities in the world as beings. The two fundamental possibilities of movement; "fleeing" ( 4ugh&d12; ) or the inauthentic (uneigentlich) falling away from itself and remaining absorbed in the world of concern (das verfallende Sein bei) and "taking for oneself" or "pursuing" ( a` i&d12;r 3siv and di&d12;wc iv ) the facticity of its ownmost (eigentlich) possibility of existence (Sich-vorweg-im-schon-sein-in) are ultimately only to be made intelligible by recourse to Heidegger's early appropriation of Aristotelian , o&d12; r3xiv . After examining Heidegger's explicit retrieval of , o&d12; r3xiv in the later Freiburg lectures, I conclude that , o&d12; r3xiv as the origin of movement in living beings only further problematizes the ontological caesura separating Dasein from animality.