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The Phenomenological Dimension of the Theory of Meaning: A Critical Inquiry through Husserl and Wittgenstein.

机译:意义理论的现象学层面:通过胡塞尔和维特根斯坦的批判性探究。

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摘要

Given the undeniable influence of the linguistic turn, it is common to characterize epistemology in the twentieth century as centrally concerned with meaning. But many of the early twentieth-century figures who helped to inspire that turn did not characterize meaning exclusively in terms of language. In response to contemporary accounts that tend to limit the scope of meaning to the semantic, pragmatic or conceptual, I use the work of Husserl and Wittgenstein to argue for the importance of non-linguistic aspects of lived experience (Erlebnis) to the theory of meaning, situating the project historically as a legacy of Kant's Critical epistemology and systematically in terms of contemporary debates about the role and status of nonconceptual content.;I argue in Chapter One that a robust theory of meaning must take account of the way the conditions of the possibility for meaning are determined by intrinsically value-bearing features of everyday experience, features that are not themselves inherently linguistic or conceptual. Most contemporary nonconceptualist accounts of perceptual experience fail to adequately theorize the role of the nonconceptual on its own terms, reducing nonconceptual elements of experience to that of mere "fodder" for conceptualization and ignoring the epistemic role the nonconceptual plays in determining structural conditions of possibility. This can be overcome through a transcendental-constitutional approach that examines the full range of experiential structures---including those not mediated by language or concepts---by which meaning is constituted.;Tracing a series of parallel developments in the theories of meaning of Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapters Two through Five, I argue that---despite important differences---both authors' later conceptions of meaning necessarily include accounts of its relation to an inexact, non-linguistic dimension of experiential life: the lifeworld (Husserl) or form(s) of life (Wittgenstein). What appears from the standpoint of linguistic and conceptual analysis to be an unfortunate inexactness is in terms of the later conceptions of both philosophers not the result of incomplete analysis, but of a recognition of the ontological primacy of the lived and fundamentally social phenomenon of meaningfulness that characterizes our experience in a way that outstrips conceptual and linguistic representation.
机译:鉴于语言学转向的不可否认的影响,通常将二十世纪的认识论表征为与意义有关的中心。但是,二十世纪初的许多启发了这一转变的人物并没有仅仅用语言来描述意义。为了回应倾向于将意义范围限制在语义,语用或概念上的当代说法,我使用胡塞尔和维特根斯坦的著作来论证生活经验(语言)的非语言方面对意义理论的重要性,从历史上看该项目是康德批判认识论的遗产,系统地根据当代关于非概念性内容的作用和地位的辩论来进行。;我在第一章中指出,有意义的意义理论必须考虑到条件的方式意义的可能性取决于日常经验的内在价值承载特征,而这些特征本身并不是固有的语言或概念特征。当代的大多数非观念主义者对知觉经验的解释都未能以其自身的术语充分地理论化非观念的作用,从而将经验的非观念要素简化为仅仅用于概念化的“饲料”,并忽略了非观念在确定可能性的结构性条件中所起的认识论作用。这可以通过先验的宪政方法来克服,该方法检查构成经验的所有体验结构-包括不是由语言或概念所介导的所有体验结构;-在意义理论中进行一系列平行发展在第二章至第五章中,我对胡塞尔和维特根斯坦的观点进行了论述,尽管存在重要差异,但我认为,两位作者后来的意义概念都必须包括其与体验生活的不精确,非语言维度的关系的说明:生活世界(胡塞尔(Husserl)或生命形式(维特根斯坦(Wittgenstein))。从语言和概念分析的角度来看,不幸的是不精确,这是因为这两个哲学家的后期概念都不是不完整分析的结果,而是对存在的,从根本上说有意义的社会现象的本体论地位的认可。以超越概念和语言表示的方式来表征我们的经验。

著录项

  • 作者

    Rump, Jacob Martin.;

  • 作者单位

    Emory University.;

  • 授予单位 Emory University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.;Epistemology.;Language General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2013
  • 页码 295 p.
  • 总页数 295
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:41:36

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