Self -psychology, virtue ethics, and absolute personalistic idealism in the thought of Mary Whiton Calkins.

摘要

This dissertation examines the different conceptions of personhood within Calkins's self-psychology and absolute personalistic idealism from within the context of her virtue ethics. This dissertation demonstrates that from an ethical perspective, Calkins's philosophical conception of personhood is preferable to the conception of personhood offered within her self-psychology.;The first chapter examines the conception of personhood within Calkins's self-psychology. This chapter demonstrates that while Calkins's self-psychology acknowledges personhood on the part of the self of the introspective psychologist, other human beings, and gods, it does not acknowledge personhood on the part of animals, nature, or the human body. The second chapter examines the conception of personhood within Calkins's absolute personalistic idealism. This chapter demonstrates that unlike Calkins's self-psychology, her absolute personalistic idealism acknowledges the personhood of animals, nature, and the human body. The third chapter examines the conception of personhood within Calkins's virtue ethics. This chapter demonstrates that whereas an application of the conception of personhood found within Calkins's self-psychology to Calkins's ethics results in an ethics that is anthropocentric, an application of the conception of personhood found within absolute personalistic idealism results in an ethics that disrupts the anthropocentric worldview by conceiving animals and nature as members of the universal community.