Hegel's rationalist account of the moral will (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel).

摘要

This dissertation treats Hegel's theory of the moral will. While many commentators have claimed that Hegel does not believe reason is practical with regard to moral motivation, I argue that he is in fact committed to the thesis that agents are motivated by the consideration that an action is morally required. On the interpretation offered, Hegel turns out to be an internalist about motivation and an advocate of a version of the "duty motive." Chapter 1 presents an overview of Hegel's attitude to key elements of the Kantian view of morality. Communitarian and virtue-ethical readings of Hegel's critique of Kant have more recently given way to the idea that Hegel is an exponent of rationalist views about the content of morality. I claim that this shift is a constructive one and suggest why there is reason to extend it into the domain of motivation and the good will. Chapter 2 addresses motivational skepticism by way of the crucial notion of particularity. I argue that the particular will is not necessarily a will motivated by inclination and therefore that Hegel's appeal to the right of particularity should be understood not as an expression of doubt about reason's capacity to motivate, but rather of the idea that moral agency requires subjective freedom. Chapter 3 considers Hegel's position on happiness and finds that moral reasons can be understood to be continuous with agents' interest in happiness. Moral actions yield a kind of happiness, however they are not explained by an interest in it. Chapter 4 considers how the conception of Sittlichkeit bears on the picture that has emerged. I argue that the role Hegel assigns to custom and habit there, and his corresponding emphasis on unreflective action within the social whole are consistent with rationalism. I conclude with a discussion of the ramifications of this interpretation for an account of the good will, claiming that while Hegel allows for motivational overdetermination, moral worth nonetheless requires that the agent act with knowledge of, and for the sake of, the moral good.