Evolutionary theory and the belief/desire model of the mind.

摘要

In this dissertation, I assess the manner in which and the extent to which evolutionary theory can be brought to bear on the study of our minds (and those of other organisms). Specifically, I evaluate, firstly, the methodology of evolutionary psychology, and secondly, how this methodology can be applied to various questions surrounding our belief/desire cognitive architecture.;In particular, in the first part of my dissertation, I address two methodological issues at the heart of evolutionary psychology. On the one hand, I show that the core inference on which many evolutionary psychologists rely is not generally valid; moreover, I make clear that even if this inference is made valid (e.g. by adding extra conditions to it), it needs to be decided if it is to be interpreted objectively or subjectively. On the other hand, I present a limited defence of the idea that evolutionary considerations are often used merely in a heuristic way in cognitive science: in particular, I make clear that, in a small number of cases, evolutionary theory is merely used to point to interesting and novel psychological phenomena to investigate further.;In the second part of my dissertation, I apply these results to various issues surrounding our belief/desire psychology. This application takes off from the fact that, even though much of psychology, social science, and philosophy is based on a belief/desire-driven model of the mind, there are still a number of open questions concerning exactly what this model should include. In this dissertation, I consider the implications of an evolutionary perspective for three of these questions in more detail: why we have beliefs and desires at all, what the differences are between beliefs and desires, and how we use beliefs and desires to make decisions.