Common interests vs. self interests: Global environment public goods provision.

摘要

Collective action is frequently compromised by free riding. One salient nature of environmental problems is that the social cost of pollution exceeds the private cost. Thus, private sectors do not have sufficient incentives to tackle pollution. Pollution is usually regulated by governments. Transboundary pollution, however, poses new challenges to environmental regulation. In absence of an overarching authority, any country can free ride on others' pollution abatement efforts. In face of global problems, how do countries balance the common interests of humankind with their national interests?;This study examines voluntary provision of global public goods in the case of global warming. After surveying theoretical models on collective action and previous empirical literatures on voluntary abatement of global pollution, the study demonstrates, with an empirical model, that free riding still inhibits voluntary mitigation of global warming values on public goods provision. The study reveals that their different attitudes toward global warming are rooted more in the difference in payoffs from global warming mitigation than in social values or institution framework.