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Color fictionalism: Color discourse without colors.

机译:色彩虚构主义:没有色彩的色彩话语。

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摘要

In this dissertation I defend an error theory of color, which I call prescriptive color fictionalism. I argue that although our color discourse is false, we should continue employing it as we have thus far but stop believing that color properties exist.;I begin with an analysis of ordinary color concepts and I argue that they fail to denote physical properties (chapter 1). This claim is widely accepted by most color realists, who I call revisionists, since they attempt to revise our color concepts in order to succeed in denoting physical properties. I discuss three such views: the primary-quality account, relationalism, and disjunctive physicalism and argue that they are inadequate (chapter 2). I then consider two non-revisionist color theories, which I call strict and relaxed representationalism and argue that they too are inadequate (chapter 2).;In chapter three, I try to motivate an error theory of color and argue that eliminativism, which is a variation of an error theory according to which color disocurse should be eliminated precisely because it is false, is unmotivated. In chapter four, I take up color subjectivism, which says that colors are mental properties, and argue that it faces two insuperable problems: the problem of finding standards of correctness and the problem of commonality of reference.;In chapters five and six, I offer a positive account. I first consider how fictionalist accounts work in various domains (chapter 5) and propose a prescriptive fictionalist account of color (chapter 6). It is prescriptive because it recommends that we change our practices in order to continue talking about colors (ordinarily understood); it fictionalism because to talk about colors is to pretend that colors exist. By formulating a fictionalist theory of color and showing that we can save our color discourse without having to add color properties in our ontology, I provide an attractive alternative to color realism and offer a viable solution to the general problem of color.
机译:在这篇论文中,我捍卫色彩错误理论,我称其为规范色彩虚构主义。我认为尽管我们的色彩论述是错误的,但我们应该像目前一样继续使用它,但不要相信色彩属性的存在。;我首先分析了普通色彩概念,并认为它们不能表示物理属性(本章) 1)。大多数色彩写实主义者(我称为修正主义者)已广泛接受这种说法,因为他们试图修改我们的色彩概念以成功表示物理特性。我讨论了三种这样的观点:基本质量论,关系论和析取物理论,并认为它们是不适当的(第2章)。然后,我考虑两种非修正主义者的色彩理论,我称其为严格和宽松的代表主义,并认为它们也不足够(第2章)。在第三章中,我试图激发色彩的错误理论,并提出消极主义,即错误理论的一种变体是没有动机的,根据该变体,应准确消除由于颜色错误而造成的颜色不纯现象。在第四章中,我讨论了颜色主观主义,它说颜色是精神属性,并辩称它面临两个不可克服的问题:寻找正确性标准的问题和参照的共同性问题。在第五和第六章中,我提供一个积极的帐户。我首先考虑虚构主义的叙述在各个领域是如何工作的(第5章),并提出了一种色彩的描述性虚构主义的叙述(第6章)。这是说明性的,因为它建议我们更改惯例以继续谈论颜色(通常理解);它是虚构的,因为谈论色彩就是假装色彩的存在。通过提出一种虚构的色彩理论,并表明我们可以节省色彩论述而不必在本体中添加色彩属性,我为色彩写实主义提供了一种有吸引力的替代方案,并为色彩的一般问题提供了可行的解决方案。

著录项

  • 作者

    Gatzia, Dimitria Electra.;

  • 作者单位

    Syracuse University.;

  • 授予单位 Syracuse University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2007
  • 页码 231 p.
  • 总页数 231
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:40:01

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