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Essays in applied economics on the role for a third player in agency relationships.

机译:应用经济学中有关代理关系中的第三者角色的论文。

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摘要

Agency theory has provided a deep understanding of the conditions under which incentives manage to reconcile the diverging interests experienced by the principal and the agent. The essays presented in this thesis evaluate the empirical relevance of those results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. We focus on three archetypal situations: corruption behavior, the practice patterns of physicians and the demand for underground work.; First, corruption refers to situations in which two contracts are at stake: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. We first provide a survey of both empirical and theoretical recent literature on corruption, highlighting how corruption behavior results from the properties of each of those two contracts. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two contradictory agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-players experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wage on corruption.; Second, the supply of health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly worried about the quality (health) provided whereas containing health care cost is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further understanding into the ability of incentives to account for those two contradictory objectives. To this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis is aimed at evaluating how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999, has affected physicians practice patterns. The labour supply of physicians is described both by the extensive margins (total hours of work, number of services delivered) and the intensive margin (time devoted to each patient). Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians on the basis of their preferences regarding work practice.; Last, the demand for underground work departs from previously analysed illegal behavior due to the benefit of illegality depending upon competitors' behavior. We set up a theoretical model linking the individual demand for underground work to this feature, with specific emphasis on the potential deterrence effect of denunciation. We first show that competition leads to the rather intuitive Bertrand curse: evasion occurs at the only equilibrium although it opens the door for a price war that cancels out the benefit of illegality. We next turn to the conditions under which an industry can sustain collusive evasion, a strategy where evasion benefits are recovered thanks to a collusive pricing behavior. Denunciation is shown to help firms in supporting this strategy at equilibrium, hence fostering underground work. Our empirical evidence supports those results. This leads to strong support against adding denunciation to actual deterrence policies.; Overall, those three applications highlight the central role played by the interests of the three players involved, respectively: divergent, convergent but contradictory and divergent but helped by a mechanism of reconciliation.; Keywords: Incentives, Principal-Agent relationships, Illegal behavior, Health care supply, Payment methods, Collusion, Applied econometrics, Laboratory Experiments (JEL Codes: K42, K12, I11, I18, J33, D21, L41, C25, C91).
机译:代理理论对激励在何种条件下调和了委托人和代理人所经历的不同利益提供了深刻的理解。本文提出的论文评估了当第三方与主要合同互动时,这些结果的经验相关性。我们关注三种典型情况:腐败行为,医生的执业方式和对地下工作的需求。首先,腐败是指有两个合同处于危险之中的情况:委托人与代理人之间的委托合同以及该代理人与第三人(称为贿赂人)之间缔结的腐败协定。我们首先提供有关腐败的经验和理论最新文献的调查,重点介绍腐败行为是如何从这两个合同的属性中产生的。此后,我们表明,由于这两个相互矛盾的协议,代理面临互惠冲突。在我们的三人实验游戏中,观察到的行为支持了由此产生的委托效应,可以解释工资对腐败的威慑作用。其次,医疗保健的提供受到矛盾目标的支配:患者主要担心所提供的质量(医疗保健),而控制医疗保健费用是医疗保健管理者的主要目标。我们对激励机制解决这两个矛盾目标的能力提供了进一步的了解。为此,我们的理论和计量经济学分析旨在评估1999年在魁北克推出的新的混合薪酬方案如何影响医生的执业方式。医师的劳动力供应既可以通过广泛的边际(工作总小时数,提供的服务数量)和密集的边际(用于每个患者的时间)来描述。自由切换被证明是这项改革的基本特征,因为它根据医生对工作实践的偏好在医生之间进行了筛选。最后,由于依赖于竞争对手行为的违法行为,对地下工作的需求与先前分析的违法行为背道而驰。我们建立了一个理论模型,将地下工作的个人需求与此功能相关联,特别强调了退出的潜在威慑作用。我们首先表明,竞争导致了相当直觉的贝特朗诅咒:逃避发生在唯一的平衡点,尽管它为价格战打开了大门,抵消了非法利益。接下来,我们转向一个行业可以维持合谋逃避的条件,这种策略可以通过合谋定价行为来收回逃避利益。证明退出可以帮助企业在平衡时支持该策略,从而促进地下工作。我们的经验证据支持这些结果。这就为反对在实际的威慑政策中增加谴责提供了强有力的支持。总体而言,这三个应用突出表明了所涉及的三个参与者的利益所起的核心作用:分歧,趋同但相互矛盾,分歧但由于和解机制有所帮助。关键字:激励,委托人与代理人的关系,违法行为,卫生保健供给,付款方式,合谋,应用计量经济学,实验室实验(JEL代码:K42,K12,I11,I18,J33,D21,L41,C25,C91)。

著录项

  • 作者

    Jacquemet, Nicolas.;

  • 作者单位

    Universite Laval (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 Universite Laval (Canada).;
  • 学科 Economics Labor.; Health Sciences Health Care Management.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2006
  • 页码 317 p.
  • 总页数 317
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 F24;R1;
  • 关键词

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