Freedom, inclination, and moral worth: An analysis of some interpretations of Kantian moral worth and their implications for a deontological ethics.

摘要

Though most agree that Kant believed those acts that are done from duty have moral worth, what constitutes being done from duty is not so obvious. It is my contention that a sufficient understanding of moral worth requires a keen grasp on Kant's intentions for an ethics; primarily his interest in a metaphysics of morals. In addition, I argue that moral worth is best understood in light of Kant's notions of freedom and inclinations. While most readers grant that Kant insisted that freedom, though un-provable, is necessary for ethics, few devote sufficient attention to the issue. In this thesis, I attempt to show that genuine attention to this principle of Kant's not only clarifies what moral worth entails; it also prevents misinterpretations of other aspects of Kant's project. I argue that Kant's view of freedom is libertarian. Also, while the will is rational, it is free in such a way that it may defy reason. Ultimately, I contend that any interpretation that challenges these two claims or results in implications that challenge them is in some way inaccurate. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)