In this dissertation, I argue for the thesis that the sole denizens of reality are extrinsic universals, that is, repeatable entities with a qualitative character, each of which depends for its existence on some other universal. Although figures such as Plato and Russell upheld analogous theses, nowadays, this is a rather unpopular and controversial view. I believe this view can shed some new light on an old, and undeservedly forgotten, metaphysical picture, which is best suited to accommodate the way in which we gain knowledge of reality. My goal in the dissertation is to draw this picture using the tools of contemporary metaphysics and semantics. I begin by arguing that properties are necessary in order to do ontology. I then examine and reject the various criteria for singling out individuals via their properties. Thus, although we do have evidence for the existence of properties, we find it problematic to bind them to individuals. It is here that I propose to dispense with individuals altogether. I argue for the existence of a specific type of property, i.e., universals. Moreover, in light of some arguments I offer against the existence of intrinsic properties, I suggest that all universals are extrinsic. Hence, the name of my view: Extrinsic Universalism.
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