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A defense of a descriptivist theory of natural kind terms.

机译:对自然种类术语的描述论理论的辩护。

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摘要

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to defend a descriptivist theory of the semantics of natural kind terms. That defense will be launched via a detailed examination of two issues-- first, an examination of what's right (and what's wrong) with psychological essentialism, a theory of concepts offered up in psychology that some philosophers including Derk Pereboom and Hilary Kornblith have recently taken an interest in. According to Pereboom, psychological essentialism needs to be true for belief/description/conception-based theories of natural kind term concepts to be plausible. I will argue that psychological essentialism does need to be true for descriptivism to be plausible, but not for the reasons that Pereboom gives. I then go on to defend descriptivism from anti-descriptivist arguments that Saul Kripke offers up in Naming and Necessity. I pursue a line of defense against Kripke's arguments that involves actualizing concept-characterizing descriptions. I go on to defend a brand of actualized descriptivism from arguments that Scott Soames launches in Beyond Rigidity. I do so by arguing that the conventions that govern de dicto belief reports are not as straightforward as they are sometimes taken to be.;The above represents the central thesis of the dissertation, but in the course of arguing for it I will engage a number of issues that naturally emerge from launching such a defense, among them, the similarities and differences between Locke's picture of natural kind terms and Putnam's picture of natural kind terms, what essentialism is, what it means for a kind term to be a rigid designator, and why the fact that natural kind terms are rigid designators presents a problem for the descriptivist.
机译:本文的主要目的是捍卫自然种类术语语义的描述论。这种辩护将通过对以下两个问题的详细研究来展开:首先,对心理学本质主义的正确与错误进行检验,这是心理学家提出的一种概念理论,包括德克·佩罗布姆(Derk Pereboom)和希拉里·科恩布利斯(Hilary Kornblith)根据Pereboom的说法,要使基于信仰/描述/观念的自然种类术语概念的理论变得合理,就必须有心理本质主义。我将争辩说,心理本质主义确实需要真实才能使描述主义具有合理性,但并非出于Pereboom给出的理由。然后,我继续捍卫描述主义,以免受Saul Kripke在“命名与必要性”中提出的反描述主义论点的影响。我针对Kripke的论点采取了防御措施,其中涉及实现概念特征描述。我继续用Scott Soames在《超越刚性》中提出的论据来捍卫一种实践的描述主义品牌。我通过争论来控制决定性信仰报告的公约并不像有时被认为的那么简单。;以上代表了论文的中心论点,但是在争论的过程中,我将投入大量精力。发起这样的辩护自然会产生一些问题,其中包括洛克的自然种类术语图和普特南的自然种类术语图之间的异同,本质主义是什么,一个术语成为僵化指示符意味着什么,以及为什么自然种类术语是僵化的指示符这一事实给描述主义者带来了一个问题。

著录项

  • 作者

    Wolfe, David.;

  • 作者单位

    Columbia University.;

  • 授予单位 Columbia University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2007
  • 页码 232 p.
  • 总页数 232
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:39:43

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